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Notes
Investment of Pension and
Profit-Sharing Trust Funds in the
Employer's Business Under the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954
The Internal Revenue Code does not provide clear direc-
tions for the operation of a qualified employees' trust. As
a result, uncertainty surrounds the tax status of trust in-
vestments in the employer's business. The author of this
Note analyzes the restrictions imposed upon such invest-
ments and demonstrates their effects upon four basic
transactions between the employer and the employees'
trust. He concludes that the Code allows extensive in-
vestments in the employer's business and that Congress
should provide specific guides for such investments in or-
der to protect the employees' interests.
INTRODUCTION
During the past decade the value of private pension and profit-
sharing funds has increased almost 400 per cent.' While many
factors have contributed to this increase,2 the most significant
have been the tax allowances granted in connection with quali-
fied trusts. These allowances have enabled qualified pension and
1. SEC, Survey of Pension Fund Investments, Statistical Series Release
No. 1680, May 31, 1960. See S. RP. No. 1734, 84th Cong., 2d Sess.
13 (1956); TILoVE, PENSION FuNDs AND ECONOMiC FREEDOM 9-19(1959); Note, 70 HARv. L. REV. 490 (1957).
2. Some of the contributing factors were: (1) § 9(a) of the National
Labor Relations Act which required employers to bargain on the es-
tablishment of pension plans, Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 247 (7th
Cir. 1948); (2) the "wage freeze" imposed during World War II, 56 Stat.
765, 768 (1942), and the Korean conflict, 64 Stat. 803 (1950), which ex-
cepted "fringe benefits" because they were non-inflationary; and (3) an ex-
tended period of prosperity combined with high corporate tax rates which
made deductible expenditures desirable. See generally, Isaacson, Employee
Welfare and Pension Plans: Regulation and Protection of Employee Rights,
59 COLUm. L. REv. 96, 98 (1959); Note, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 78, 79-80(1958).
3.
In order for a trust forming part of a pension, profit-sharing, or
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profit-sharing plans to enjoy a comparatively low net cost.4 The
employer's contribution to the employees' trust is deductible from
gross earnings;5 the employees' tax liability caused by the em-
ployer's contribution is deferred until benefits are received;' and
stock bonus plan to constitute a qualified trust under section 401(a),
the following tests must be met:(i) It must be created or organized in the United States, as defined
in section 7701(a) (9), and it must be maintained at all times as a do-
mestic trust in the United States;
(ii) It must be part of a pension, profit-sharing, or stock bonus
plan established by an employer for the exclusive benefit of his em-
ployees or their beneficiaries . . . ;
(iii) It must be formed or availed of for the purpose of distributing
to the employees or their beneficiaries the corpus and income of the
fund accumulated by the trust in accordance with the plan;
(iv) It must be impossible under the trust instrument at any time
before the satisfaction of all liabilities with respect to employees and
their beneficiaries under the trust, for any part of the corpus or income
to be used for, or diverted to, purposes other than for the exclusive
benefit of the employees or their beneficiaries . . . ;
(v) It must be part of a plan which benefits prescribed percentages
of the employees, or which benefits such employees as qualify, under a
classification set up by the employer and found by the Commissioner
not to be discriminatory in favor of certain specified classes of em-
ployees . . . ; and(vi) It must be part of a plan under which contributions or bene-
fits do not discriminate in favor of certain specified classes of em-
ployees ....
Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(a) (3) (1958).
For a discussion of non-qualified deferred compensation arrangements
see Neal, Deferred Compensation Plans: Qualifying For Non-Qualified
Treatment, in SELECTED PROBLEMS IN THE LAW OF CORPORATE PRACTICE
374 (Roady & Andersen ed. 1960).
4. S. REP. No. 1734, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1956). See RoBBINs, IM-
PACT OF TAXES ON INDUSTRIAL PENSION PLANS 46-62 (Industrial Relations
MONOGRAPH No. 14, 1949); Wilson, Employee Pension Plans, 15 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 340 (1950).
As one author commented,
the Federal Government is presently subsidizing private pension pro-
grams. by allowing deduction of payments to pension plans as ex-
penses, by exempting income from pension funds from taxation, and
by favorable tax treatment of employees covered by the plan.
Id. at 351.
5. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 404 [hereinafter cited as I.R.C.]. In or-
der to qualify as a deduction under § 404, however, the contribution must
also meet the requirements of a deductible expense under § 162 or § 212.
I.R.C. § 404(a). Thus, the contribution must be an ordinary and neces-
sary expense of the employer in carrying on his trade or business, or it must
be for the production of income. Furthermore, the contribution must be
compensation for personal services actually rendered. I.R.C. §§ 162, 212;
Treas. Reg. § 1.404(a)-1 (b) (1956).
6. I.R.C. § 402(a); cf. I.R.C. § 72(d). The employee or his beneficiary
must report as taxable income or gain, benefits "distributed or made avail-
able" to him. Benefits "made available" include trust funds used to pur-
chase life insurance for the employees, Raymond J. Moore, 45 B.T.A.
1073 (1941), or to provide a current economic advantage. Alexander,
Rights of Employees and Their Widows and Heirs, Under Qualified Section
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the income earned by the trust is tax exempt7
Today, private corporate pension and profit-sharing funds have
accumulated assets in excess of $44 billion.' More than half of
this amount is held by noninsured plans and is available for in-
vestment in the employer's business.' However, few trusts have
used their funds to increase the employer's working capital.'0
Several factors have accounted for the absence of trust investment
in the employers' businesses. In the first place, the pension and
profit-sharing field is "one of the most complicated and involved
parts of the law."'" Consequently, fund trustees are uncertain
what investments in employers' businesses are permitted. Also,
the trustees are usually officers of the employer-company and thus
reluctant to engage in transactions that may open them to a charge
401(a) Plans: Income Tax Consequences, N.Y.U. 16TH INsT. ON FED.
TAx 37, 38-39 (1958).
7. I.R.C. §§ 401, 501(a).
8. SEC, Survey of Pension Fund Investments, Statistical Series Release
No. 1680, May 31, 1960.
9. Ibid. In contrast to noninsured funds, insured pension funds are used
for the purchase of insurance either by the employer or by an employees'
trust established under the plan. Therefore, insured pension funds are not
available for other investments. Otherwise, with few exceptions, the plans
are trust administered and the funds are available for investment by the
trustees. For a thorough description of the various types of plans see N.Y.
STATE INS. DEP'T, PRIVATE EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLANs-A PuBLic TRUST
71-88 (1956); Note, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 78, 81-90 (1958).
10. For example, in a survey of 1,024 pension trusts with book value
assets of $4.9 billion, only 109 trusts indicated any investments in the em-
ployer corporation. These investments in the employer's business amounted
to $315 million and were rated as follows: 95.05% were of investment
gade, .59% were sub-standard, and 4.36% were not rated. Almost 90%
of the investments were in the employer's bonds; the remainder were dis-
tributed among stocks, real estate with leasebacks, and promissory notes.
N.Y. STATE BANKING DEP'T, PENSION AND OTHER EMPLOYEE WELFARE
FuNDs at xiv, xvi, 28-29 (1955).
The Securities and Exchange Commission has reported that at the end
of 1954 company stock investments represented 2.7% of pension fund as-
sets.
Of this amount . . . 85 per cent was held by trade companies, almost
all of which was accounted for by the holdings of the Savings and
Profit Sharing Pension Fund of Sears, Roebuck & Co. employees. If
the Sears fund is excluded, then the percentage of total assets invested
in own company stock drops to one-half of one percent.
SEC, SURVEY OF CORPORATE PENSION FuNDs, 1951-1954, at 13 (1956).
See Business Week, Jan. 31, 1959, pp. 88, 98-99.
11. Durkin, Non-Qualified Deferred Compensation Plans, 29 U. CINc.
L. REv. 68, 69 (1960).
As Mr. Goodman, Chief of the Internal Revenue Service Pension Trust
Service, admitted, "the tax problems which arise in the investment of an
exempt employees' trust are many and varied." Address by Isidore Good-
man, Western Pension Conference (Los Angeles Chapter), Nov. 17, 1960,
in- 2 CCH PENSION PLAN RuL. 11106. Thus, the prudent trustee will re-
quest an advance ruling on investments in the employer's business. See I
RABKIN & JOHNSON, FEDERAL INcomE, GIrT AND ESTATE TAXATION
§ 15.01, at 1504 (1954).
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of self-dealing.12 Finally, as guardians of the employees' inter-
ests, the trustees are concerned with the fact that such investment
will increase the employees' exposure to the hazards of the busi-
ness.
13
The purpose of this Note is to outline four types of investments
in the employer's business that are available to a qualified trust.
The Note will first discuss the restrictions imposed on trust invest-
ments in the employer's business and then consider the effect of
these restrictions upon four basic transactions between the employ-
er and the employees' trust.
1. RESTRICTIONS ON EMPLOYEES'
TRUST INVESTMENTS
Although the initial qualification of a pension or profit-sharing
trust is governed by explicit provisions, 4 the 1954 Internal Reve-
nue Code does not provide clear directions concerning the trust's
operation. 5 There is a continuation of the 1939 Code policy of
not specifically limiting the investments available to qualified em-
ployees' trusts.' However, the fact of qualification does not re-
lieve the trustee of his duty to comply with the provisions of the
12. Six examples of "self-dealing" investments are described in N.Y.
STATE INS. DEP'T, op. cit. supra note 9, at 128, 129. Compare AFL-CIO
Policy on Health, Welfare Funds, 37 LRRM 77, 80 (1955).
13. As the vice chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Re-
serve System testified before Senator Paul Douglas' welfare and pension
plan investigation subcommittee:
Senator Douglas. But as to separate pension plans, do you think it
is wise general practice to have the funds invested in securities of the
same company in which the men have jobs?
Mr. Balderston. In general I do not. First of all, it violates the prin-
ciple of diversification of investments, and secondly, it places employee
funds that they should be able to rely upon in "rainy seasons" in the
same company on which they depend for their jobs and livelihoods.
Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Welfare and Pension Funds of the
Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 84th Cong., 1st Sess.,
pt. 3, at 893 (1955) [hereinafter cited as 1955 Hearings]. It is not sur-
prising that the "typical insured [sic] pension plan, for example, is invested
entirely in fixed-dollar securities-bonds and preferred stocks-which guar-
antee delivery of the proper dollars at maturity-but not the purchasing
power of those dollars . . . ." Kearns, Protecting Qualified Plans with
Mutual Funds, 37 TAXES 1023, 1024 (1959). See generally, Buck, "Qualil-
fied" Trustee Performance, 99 TRUSTS & ESTATES 194, 196 (1960); Lack-
man, Investment Relations With Company, 96 TRUSTS & ESTATES 258-59
(1957).
This problem is not peculiar to the United States. Canada, for example,
discourages pension fund investments in the employer's business by sum-
mary denial of the employer's tax deductions for contributions to such
plans. S. REP. No. 1734, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 52 n.19 (1956).
14. I.R.C. § 401(a). See note 3 supra.
15. "No specific limitations are provided in section 401(a) with respect
to investments which may be made by the trustees of a trust qualifying
under section 401(a)." Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b)(5)(i) (1958).
16. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.165-1(a) (1943).
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trust instrument and applicable local law.17 He is generally re-
stricted to those investments which would be considered proper
by the "prudent investor." Furthermore, the Commissioner has
ruled that the trustee's investments must insure that the fund
maintains sufficient liquidity to fulfill the trust's commitments un-
der the pension or profit-sharing plan.s
The "prudence" of a particular investment can be determined
only with reference to a specific pension or profit-sharing plan.
Questions of whether proper diversification and balance of in-
vestments have been achieved cannot be answered in the ab-
stract. The Code does, however, set some outer limits within
which all trust investment must remain if the trust is to maintain
a fully nontaxable status.19 First, the trust must be operated for
17. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b) (5) (i) (1958); P.S. No. 49, June 16, 1945,
in CCH 1945 STAND. FED. TAX REP. 6250. While the extent to which local
trust law applies to employees' trusts is uncertain, it is clear that local law
controls when the trust indenture is silent as to permissible investments.
Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b)(5)(i) (1958); N.Y. STATE INS. DEP'T, op. cit.
supra note 9, at 114; Note, 58 COLuM. L. REv. 78, 92-95 (1958). See 3
ScoTT, TRUSTS § 227.14 (2d ed. 1956); Rev. Rul. 57-163, 1957-1 CuM.
BuLL. 128, 135. However, the trust indenture's grant of broad investment
powers to the trustee does not alter his status as a fiduciary subject to the
rules of conduct required of trustees. See 3 ScoTT, op. cit. supra, at §§
227.1, 227.14. For example, if the investment is unsound, although author-
ized by the trust instrument, the trustee is surchargeable for losses to the
trust's beneficiaries.
18. Rev. Rul. 57-163, 1957-1 CuM. BULL. 128, 135. See Scully,
Changing Concepts of Trust Investments: Diversification of Investments,
97 TRUSTS & ESTATES 912 (1958); Ziskind, The Law of Employee Benefit
Plans, 1955 WASH. U.L.Q. 112, 122-25.
In the case of an investment in the stock of a "close corporation," 1
O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 1.02 (1958), the trust's major problem is
the fact that the stock is not marketable and therefore the investment is
not liquid, see id. § 1.07 at 15-16. However, the trustee's ability to closely
supervise the investment would seem to be an adequate substitute for mar-
ketability. Thus, in order to insure that the trustee retains his ability to
closely supervise the investment, the purchase agreement should provide
for a veto power, "control of distribution," or a buy-out clause. See gen-
erallyid. §§ 4, 5; 2 id. § 7.
19. These tax rules are not designed to guarantee the actuarial sound-
ness of the trust; instead, they are designed to limit the amount that can
be deducted for tax purposes and to protect the employees' interests. They
do, however, incidentally establish minimum standards for the operation
of the !rust. See 1955 Hearings at 838, 847.
While the tax rules were created for income tax purposes, violation of
them can victimize parties that should be protected, the employee-bene-
ficiaries. For example, if the trustee intentionally misuses trust funds, the
tax consequences may include an assessment against the trust. The assess-
ment is imposed because the loss of the trust's tax exemption is retroactive
to the time of the infraction. Furthermore, the employees are denied tax
deferment. See note 35 infra. See also S. REP. No. 1440, 85th Cong., 2d
Sess. 15-16 (1958). However, the consequence of a tax rule violation has,
in some cases, so thwarted the rules' purposes that the courts have mitigated
their effect. For example, in Time Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 258 F.2d 237,
239 (9th Cir. 1958), the employer's variations from the approved plan nei-
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the exclusive benefit of the employees or their beneficiaries.20
Second, the trust must not engage in any "prohibited transac-
tions."'" Third, the trust must not earn "unrelated business tax-
able income. '2  Depending upon which of these rules is violated,
the trust's status may be affected in different ways with differing
tax consequences to the employer, the employees, and the trust.
A. EXCLUSIVE BENEFIT RULE
Section 401 (a) provides that an employees' trust which is part
of a plan "for the exclusive benefit" of the employees or their
beneficiaries is a qualified trust "if under the trust instrument it
is impossible . . . for any part of the corpus or income to be
. . . used for, or diverted to, purposes other than for the exclusive
benefit" of the employees. 3 While it is arguable that the literal
language of the Code applies the exclusive benefit rule only to the
establishment of the trust, 4 the "exclusive benefit" requirement
has been applied to the trust's operation.25 Hence, if the trust is
to retain its qualified status the fund must be administered for the
exclusive benefit of the employees.
While the requirement that the trust be administered for the
employees' exclusive benefit applies to the trust's total investment
plan,26 the major interpretive problem arises in regard to the in-
dividual transactions entered into by the trust. The Commissioner
has created four coordinate and conjunctive tests by which to de-
termine compliance with the exclusive benefit rule:
ther benefited him nor injured the employees. Since a loss of the trust's
tax exemption would have injured the employees, the trust was permitted
to retain its qualified and exempt status.
20. I.R.C. § 401(a).
21. I.R.C. § 503(c).
22. I.R.C. § 511.
23. I.R.C. § 401 (a) (2). (Emphasis added.)
24. Section 401(a) appears to cover only the "requirements for qualifi-
cation" of a plan. With one exception the subsections under § 401 (a) are
technical requirements governing the trust's qualification. Subsection (2)
prohibits the use or diversion of trust funds for purposes other than for the
exclusive benefit of the employees. However, this subsection is limited by
the clause that such "use or diversion" must be made impossible by the
trust instrument. I.R.C. § 401(a) (2). Therefore, the literal language of
§ 401 (a) would appear to cover only the trust's initial qualification.
25. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1 (b) (3) (1958) ("The law is concerned not only
with the form of a plan but also with its effect in operation."). See H.R.
REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 103 (1942); Tavannes Watch Co. v.
Commissioner, 176 F.2d 211, 216 (2d Cir. 1949); Bomar, Requirements
for Qualification of Plans (Compensation Problems: Pension and Profit-
Sharing), N.Y.U. 13TH INST. ON FED. TAx 395, 402 (1955).
Disqualification of the plan for violation of the exclusive benefit rule re-
sults in an automatic and immediate loss of the trust's tax exemption at the
time of the violation. I.R.C. § 501(a). See H. S. D. Co. v. Kavanagh, 191
F.2d 831, 843-46 (6th Cir. 1951).
26. See text accompanying notes 17-19 supra.
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the cost must not exceed fair market value at the time of purchase, a
fair return commensurate with the prevailing rate must be provided,
sufficient liquidity is to be maintained so as to permit distributions in
accordance with the terms of the plan, and the safeguards that a
prudent investor would look to are to exist.27
In order to comply with these tests, every transaction entered into
by the trust must meet the standards of an "arms-length" transac-
tion.21 Thus, if the trust purchases property the purchase price
must not exceed the property's fair market value, and the purchase
must not result in an impairment of the trust fund's liquidity; if
the trust sells property the sale price must not be less than the
property's fair market value; if the trust leases property it must re-
ceive rent equivalent to that received by lessors of similar proper-
ty; or, if the trust loans money it must receive the prevailing rate
of interest, and the loan must be a reasonably secure investment.
In a transaction between unrelated parties, the competing interests
of the trust and the third party would normally insure that the
transaction is at arms-length. On the other hand, if the trust
deals with the employer (or other related party), compliance with
the standard of a fair market price or adequate return standard
should insure that a constructive arms-length transaction has taken
place.2"
Although the transaction must be for the employees' exclusive
benefit, this rule does not prohibit a transaction in which a party
other than the trust's beneficiaries receives a benefit. In fact, an
arms-length transaction assumes that the transaction is beneficial
to both parties. As a result, the Commissioner has ruled that the
trust will retain its qualified status even though the transaction
confers incidental benefits upon someone other than the employees
or their beneficiaries. 30 However, this ruling does not limit the
original requirement that from the trust's view the transaction
must be for the employees' exclusive benefit. Hence, the exclusive
benefit rule is violated only if the transaction is so weighted that it
objectively appears that the primary purpose of the transaction is
to benefit someone other than the trust's beneficiaries. For ex-
ample, if the trust were to borrow funds to invest in the employ-
er's business, the trust would not necessarily have violated the
exclusive benefit rule.3 ' The trust will be disqualified in this situa-
27. Rev. Rul. 57-163, 1957-1 CuM. BULL. 128, 135.
28. For applications of what constitutes an arms-length transaction un-
der other Code sections see, e.g., Cooper Agency, 33 T.C. 709 (1960);
Virginia Metal Prod., 33 T.C. 788 (1960).
29. This assumes that "sufficient liquidity is . ..maintained and the
safeguards that a prudent investor would look to ... (do] exist." Rev.
Rul. 57-163, 1957-1 CuM. BULL. 128, 135.
30. Ibid.
31. Rev. Rul. 46, 1953-1 CuM. BULL. 287, 288.
NOTES19611
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tion only where the primary purpose of the transaction is to bene-
fit the employer-as where the trust borrows funds in order to
purchase company debentures at a time when the employer is un-
able to obtain funds from other sources.
B. PROHIBITED TRANSACTIONS RULE
The prohibited transactions rule was first applied to employees'
trusts by section 503(c) of the 1954 Code. 3 Six types of transac-
tions are prohibited. If the employees' trust engages in any of these
transactions with the employer (or other related parties)" the
trust will lose its exempt status. 5 The purpose of the section was
to insure that all dealings between an employer and his tax-exempt
trust meet the standards of an "arms-length transaction."3
The transactions between the trust and the employer which are
prohibited include: (1) a loan of trust funds without the receipt
of adequate security and a reasonable rate of interest, (2) pay-
ment of any compensation beyond a reasonable amount for per-
sonal services actually rendered, (3) making trust services avail-
able on a preferential basis, (4) a substantial purchase of property
for more than adequate consideration, (5) a sale of any substan-
tial part of the trust's assets for less than an adequate considera-
tion, or (6) any other transaction which results in a substantial
diversion of trust funds.3
With one exception, the prohibited transactions rule does not
32. Ibid.
33. Compare I.R.C. § 503(a)(1)(C) with Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch.
38, § 3813(c).
34. The prohibited transactions rule applies to transactions between the
employees' trust and (1) the trust's creator or a member of his family, (2)
a substantial contributor to the trust or a member of the contributor's fam-
ily, or (3) a corporation controlled directly or indirectly by the creator of
the trust (or substantial contributor thereto) through the ownership of 50%
or more of the voting stock (or 50% of the value of all stock). I.R.C.
§§ 267(c) (4), 503(c). This is only a "downstream" restriction. That is, the
prohibited transactions rule applies to a transaction entered into by the
trust with a subsidiary of the employer. However, the rule does not restrict
transactions between the trust and the parent of the employer. Rev. Rul.
58-526, 1958-2 CuM. BULL. 269-70.
35. I.R.C. § 503(a)(1). Treas. Reg. § 1.503(d)-1(a) (1958).
The trust's loss of exempt status is effective "only for taxable years after
the taxable year during which it is notified" by the Commissioner that the
trust has engaged in a prohibited transaction. However, notification is not
required where the purpose of the transaction was to divert a substantial
part of the trust's corpus or income to non-exempt uses. I.R.C. § 503(a)(2). While the rule's effect is prospective, except for intentional viola-
tions, the minimum penalty for any breach of the rule is a one year loss
of the trust's exempt status. Treas. Reg. § 1.503(d)-1(b) (1958). See Rev.
Proc. 57-5, 1957-1 CuM. BULL. 727-28.
36. H.R. REP. No. 2319, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 42 (1950); S. REP. No.
2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 36-37 (1950).
37. I.R.C. § 503(c).
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add any investnient restrictions to those imposed by the exclusive
benefit rule.as The only purpose of the prohibited transactions rule
is to provide the Commissioner with another and more specific
weapon against trusts that engage in unfair transactions. 9 Thus,
compliance with the investment restrictions imposed by the ex-
clusive benefit rule meets the requirements of all but one restric-
tion imposed by the prohibited transactions rule. The requirement
imposed by the prohibited transactions rule which is not encom-
passed by the exclusive benefit rule is that loans to the trust's em-
ployer must be adequately secured. Something must be pledged by
the borrowing employer "in addition to and supporting the prom-
ise to pay. "40
The prohibited transactions rule applies only to transactions be-
tween the employer and his employees' trust, while the exclusive
benefit rule applies to all transactions entered into by the trust.4"
However, the significant difference between the two rules is their
effect on the trust. Disqualification of the trust upon violation of
the exclusive benefit rule results in an automatic and immediate
loss of the trust's exempt status.4 - On the other hand, violation of
the prohibited transactions rule will result in loss of the trust's
exempt status only in the succeeding tax year.4 There is no au-
thority which directs the Commissioner to prefer either rule when
both are applicable; hence, if the rules overlap the Commissioner
seems to have complete discretion as to which rule he can apply."
C. UNRELATED BUSINESS INCOME RULE
The unrelated business income tax subjects an otherwise exempt
employees' trust to a tax at individual rates on the income it de-
rives from any unrelated trade or business.," In the case of a
qualified employees' trust, "unrelated trade or business" means
"any trade or business regularly carried on" by the trust. 6 Ap-
38. 4 MERTENS, FEDERAL INCOME TAxATION § 25B.04, at 11 n.37(Supp. 1960) [hereinafter cited as MERTENS].
39.
The prohibited transactions enumerated in section 503(c) are in ad-
dition to and not in limitation of the restrictions contained in . . .
section 401 (a).
Treas. Reg. § 1.503 (a)-1 (a) (1958). (Emphasis added.)
40. Treas. Reg. § 1.503(c)-l(b) (1958).
41. I.R.C. §§ 401(a), 503(c).
42. See note 25 supra.
43. See note 35 supra.
44. See 4 MERTENS § 25B.04, at 11; 6 id. § 34.16, at 69-70.
45. I.R.C. §§ 511(b) (2), 512(a), 513(b).
46. I.R.C. § 513(b) (2). The unrelated business income tax also applies
to a trade or business regularly carried on by a partnership of which the
trust is a member. Ibid. See Alexander, Tax Status of Pension Trusts: Re-
quirements for Maintaining Exemption, N.Y.U. 13TH INST. ON FED. TAX
435, 454 (1955).
1961]
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parently the question of whether the business is regularly carried
on is one of fact. 7 However dividend income, and other income
earned from the trust's investments, is not considered to be income
derived from the regular operation of a trade or business." Thus,
where the trust owns 100 per cent of a corporation's stock, the
trust is not subject to a tax on either the dividend income it re-
ceives or the corporation's earnings. But even if all the corpora-
tion's earnings are payable to an exempt trust, those earnings
are still subject to taxation at the corporate level.49 However, if the
trust owns the assets rather than the stock of a going concern,
the trust is operating a business and, therefore, is subject to the
unrelated business income tax."0
II. POSSIBLE INVESTMENTS IN THE
EMPLOYER'S BUSINESS
By contributing to a qualified pension or profit-sharing plan the
employer will provide his employees with additional compensa-
tion and will receive a current tax deduction from his gross earn-
ings. The trust may then invest these contributed funds in the
business and thus provide the employer with additional working
capital. This has been appropriately referred to as "How to Eat
Your Cake and Have It Too." 1
The trust may use various financial transactions as a means of
investing its funds in the employer's business. These transactions
may be grouped into the following four categories: (1) acquisi-
tion of company stock. (2) acquisition of employer obligations,
(3) acquisition of real estate which is subsequently leased to the
employer, and (4) acquisition of personal property which is sub-
sequently leased to the employer. Since the Code treats these trans-
actions differently, the specific problems they raise must be in-
dividually evaluated in light of the applicable restrictions. 2
47. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1 (a) (3) (1958).
48. I.R.C. § 512(b).
49. I.R.C. § 502 (feeder organization rule).
50. The requirement that stock ownership be interposed between the
employees' trust and the actual business operations was to insure that cor-
porate earnings would be taxed. Congress, obviously, was unwilling to fore-
go the taxation of business income. See Wallis, Employees' Trusts Under
New Code, 93 TRUSTS & ESTATES 866, 869 (1954).
51. The writer is indebted to Mr. Wood R. Foster of Saint Paul, Min-
nesota, for this description and for other ideas contained in a paper pre-
sented to the University of Minnesota Tax Institute, Dec. 9, 1960.
52. Aside from the question of restrictions, there is the practical ques-
tion of the differing opportunities various investments may offer the trust.
For example, from the trust's view company stock investments protect the
trust against inflationary trends while real estate purchases provide safety
of principal and adequate return. On the other hand, from the employer's
view trust purchases of company stock increase the employer's working
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A. INVESTMENTS IN THE EMPLOYER'S STOCK
Trust ownership of the employer's stock 3 has been severely
criticized as a violation of the principle of diversification because
too much is risked on the success of one venture." Since the
trust's basic function is to insure safety of corpus while earning
income from its investments, the argument has been made that
this objective can be assured only through diversified investments
and techniques such as the "dollar-averaging" of stock purchases.'
Nevertheless, neither the Commissioner nor the courts have dis-
approved of prudent investments in the employer's stock by an em-
ployees' trust fund.5 6
capital. Furthermore, sale-leaseback transactions with the trust not only in-
crease the employer's working capital, but also give him a rent deduction
for property that formerly may have been non-depreciable. See Greenfield,
Corporate Benefits in Using the Sale-Leaseback Device, 37 TAXES 1017,
1020-21 (1959).
53. In recent years there has been a marked shift in the investment pol-
icies of employee trusts; investment in preferred stock and securities has
given way to increased investment in common stock. SEC, Survey of Pen-
sion Fund Investments, Statistical Series Release No. 1680, May 31, 1960;
SEC, SURVEY OF CORPORATE PENSION FUNDS, 1951-1954, at 11, 27(1956). Related to this shift has been an increase in trust ownership of the
employer's common stock. The most extreme example of an investment in
company stock among large publicly-held corporations is the Savings and
Profit-Sharing Pension Fund of Sears, Roebuck & Co. employees which
"holds more than 26 per cent of the company's outstanding stock." Min-
neapolis Star, Feb. 24, 1961, § B, p 14, col. 6. This, Sears' board chair-
man conceded, gives the fund a "controlling interest in the corporation."
Hearings on S. 2054 Before the Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on
Banking and Currency, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 495-518 (1955). For an
analysis of the Sears situation see TILOvE, PENSION FUNDS AND ECON-
OMIC FREEDOM 60-66 (1959); Business Week, Jan. 31, 1959, pp. 88,
98-99.
54. See authorities cited note 13 supra. As the final report of the Doug-
las subcommittee investigating welfare and pension plans argued,
the investment of a large share of a pension fund in the employer's
assets or securities appears to violate the common sense injunction of
not putting all one's eggs in one basket. It appears to us that there
are instances . . . where the heavy investment in the employer's se-
curities or assets cannot be justified as a part of prudent management
of pension funds. There are a number of cases . . . where over 50
percent of the trust assets are invested in the securities or notes of the
employer, and where the concern is a small one and quite possibly
subject to wide swings in prosperity or adversity. In such instances,
we doubt that these pension funds give real assurance to employees
that the pensions to which they are entitled on retirement will actually
be theirs.
S. REP. No. 1734, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 53 (1956). See Griffin, Outlook for
Pension Funding, 99 TRUSTS & ESTATES 234 (1960).
55. See Scully, supra note 18, at 912, 918-19.
56. If there is no evidence of diversion of the trust's funds from the
employees' exclusive benefit, the courts have not disapproved an invest-
ment of the trust's entire corpus in the employer's stock. H. S. D. Co. v.
Kavanagh, 191 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1951) (by implication). See Time Oil
Co. v. Commissioner, 258 F.2d 237 (9th Cir. 1958); Tavannes Watch Co.
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Acquisition of the employer's stock is the least regulated em-
ployer-company investment available to an employees' trust. Al-
though there is no direct limit on the amount of such investments,
some restrictions do exist in the form of reporting requirements."
An annual information return must be filed by the trust so that the
Commissioner may determine whether or not the trust "serves any
purpose other than constituting part of a plan for the exclusive
benefit of the employees."" s Thus, if the trust is to retain its quali-
fied status after investing in the employer's stock, it must disclose
"the reasons for . . . and the conditions under which such invest-
ments are made." 9 Compliance with those reporting requirements
involving the transmission of factual information presents no prob-
lem. However, increase of the employer's working capital is al-
ways a factor in the trustee's decision to invest in the business of
the employer. Hence, there is a problem in regard to the required
disclosure of "the reasons" for the investment." If the trustee
indicates that benefit to the employer was one of "the reasons,"
the trust may be forced to prove that the exclusive benefit rule
v. Commissioner, 176 F.2d 211 (2d Cir. 1949). However, the Douglas
subcommittee on welfare and pension plans recommended further investi-
gation into the propriety of substantial trust investments in the employer's
business. S. REP. No. 1734, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 54 (1956).
57. Section 6033 of the Code requires exempt organizations to file an-
nual information returns. The Commissioner has been given broad discre-
tion over what information the trust must furnish in order to retain its
qualified status. In this regard, Rev. Rul. 57-163, 1957-1 CUM. BULL.
128, 135-36, requires that the trust must give notification of its acquisition
of the employer's stock and the trust must disclose:
1. Balance sheets of the employer as at the close of the last account-
ing period and for the taxable year ended prior thereto.
2. Comparative statements of income and profit and loss for the
last and four prior taxable years.
3. An analysis of the surplus account for the last five years, spe-
cifically showing the amount and rate of dividends paid on each class
of stock.
4. A statement accounting for all material changes from the latest
dates of the aforesaid statements to the date of filing the information.
5. A schedule showing the nature and amounts of the various assets
in the trust fund.
6. A statement showing the amount of the investment, the type of in-
vestment, the present rate of return, the security if a loan is involved,
and the reasons for the investment.
(Emphasis added.) But if an advance determination has been requested
in accordance with Rev. Proc. 56-12, 1956-1 CuM. BULL. 1029, the
disclosure need not be repeated on the annual return.
58. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b) (5) (ii) (1958).
59. Ibid.
60. The requirement of a reason for the investment may be analogous
to the "business purpose" test which is common in the 1954 Code. See,
e.g., Note, 44 MINN. L. REV. 485, 490-92 (1960) (business purpose es-
tablishes corporation as a separate taxable entity); 8 MERTENS § 46.09
(business purpose test determines whether consolidated returns may be
filed).
has not been violated even though the transaction was in fact
proper. Disclosure of factors that independently justify investment
in the employer's business-such as soundness of the investment,
liberality of the yield, and ability to closely supervise the invest-
ment-may satisfy the required statement of reasons."'
The employees' trust may acquire company stock by (1) pur-
chases on the open market, (2) direct purchases from the em-
ployer, and (3) contributions from the employer.
1. Open Market Purchases
The trust's open market purchase of actively traded employer-
company stock at the market price presents no tax problems. This
is true whether the stock is listed on an exchange or traded over
the counter. The prohibited transactions rule cannot apply be-
cause related parties are not involved. Since the fair market value
of actively traded stock is its price on the open market, the ex-
clusive benefit rule is not violated; that is, the purchase was fair
to the trust.6" If, on the other hand, the trust purchases company
stock that is not actively traded, the purchase price must not ex-
ceed the stock's "fair value" or the trust will have violated the ex-
clusive benefit rule.'
While open market purchases may indirectly benefit the em-
ployer by supporting the market price of the company's stock, this
will not result in the trust's disqualification. However, trust pur-
chases of company stock on the open market are of little use to the
employer since they do not increase his working capital.
2. Purchases from the Employer
If the company's stock is actively traded, the trustee's direct
purchase from the employer at the current market price is not
likely to be questioned. But often the stock of a close corporation
is not extensively traded. In this case, if the purchase price exceeds
61. The trustee of a pension trust should justify his investments in
terms of (1) safety of principal, (2) liquidity (this feature is usually quite
limited in case of employees' pension plans because benefit payments can
be accurately predicted), (3) certainty of return, (4) adequacy of return,(5) capital appreciation, (6) marketability, (7) collateral value and maturity,
and (8) tax consequences. For a discussion of these factors see Howell,
Common Stocks and Pension Fund Investing, Harv. Bus. Rev., Nov.-Dec.
1958, p. 92. See also note 18 supra.
62. Since "fair market value means the price at which a willing buyer
and willing seller would arrive, after negotiation for sale, where neither is
acting under compulsion," Estate of Williams v. Commissioner, 256 F.2d
217, 218 (9th Cir. 1958) (Emphasis added), the purchase of stock on the
open market would be a purchase at the stock's fair market value. See
Elmhurst Cemetery Co. v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 37, 39 (1937). Com-
pare Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2031-1(b), 25.2512-1 (1958).
63. I.R.C. § 401(a). See text accompanying notes 66-68 infra.
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the stock's "fair value," the trust's exempt status will be denied
on the ground that a prohibited transaction has occurred."4
The real problem for the employees' trust is to determine the
"fair value" of a close corporation's stock which is not actively
traded. Few guides are available.6" Even when the trust's purchase
of employer-company stock is approved in an advance determina-
tion letter, the issue of valuation is specifically excluded from the
scope of the ruling.66 Therefore, to protect the trust's exempt
status, a defensible determination of the stock's value should be
made with the assistance of an independent securities appraiser.
3. Contributions of Company Stock
When company stock is contributed to rather than purchased
by the trust, the burden of establishing the stock's "fair value"
shifts to the employer.67 That is, the employer must determine
64. I.R.C. § 503(c)(4). In addition, the trust will have violated the ex-
clusive benefit rule. However, if the value of the stock is underestimated
so that the purchase price is less than the stock's "fair value," the trust
will not lose its exempt status. "Bargain purchases" by the trust are not
contrary to the employees' best interests. While "bargain purchases" will,
in some cases, result in the realization of income, Commissioner v. Lobue,
351 U.S. 243 (1956) (employee purchase of company stock); Waldheim v.
Commissioner, 244 F.2d 1 (1957) (sale of treasury stock to shareholder),
when there is no employment or ownership relationship between the par-
ties, "the general rule is that the purchase of property for less than its
value does not, of itself, give rise to the realization of taxable income."
Fred Pellar, 25 T.C. 299, 309 (1955), acq. 1956-1 CUM. BULL. 5. See
1 MERTENS § 5.13; Greenbaum, The Basis of Property Shall Be the Cot
of Such Property: How Is Cost Defined? 3 TAx L. REv. 351, 359 (1948).
Of course, even if the trust is held to have realized income it would not be
taxed thereon unless the trust loses its exempt status.
65. For example, in the valuation of close corporation stock held by an
estate, the Commissioner has provided explicit standards:
Valuation of securities is, in essence, a prophesy as to the future
and must be based on facts available at the required date of appraisal.
It is advisable to emphasize that in the valuation of the stock of
closely held corporations or the stock of corporations where market
quotations are either lacking or too scarce to be recognized, all avail-
able financial data, as well as all relevant factors affecting the fair
market value, should be considered.
Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 CUM. BULL. 237, 238. Compare Treas. Reg.
§ 1.471-4(b) (1958). Furthermore, the trust investment must be "prudent."
See notes 17-19 supra and accompanying text.
66. Dealings which involve the prohibited transactions rule will be ruled
on by the Commissioner in an advance ruling "only if there is a clear in-
dication of value which can be established by reference to recognized
sources." Rev. Proc. 56-33, 1956-2 CuM. BULL. 1394, 1395-96. Com-
pare Rev. Proc. 56-12, 1956-1 CUM. BULL. 1029, 1032, where advance
rulings for initial qualification of trusts which invest in the employer's
stocks are conditioned by the statement: " 'The opinion herein expressed,
however, is conditioned on the purchase of such stock at a price not in
excess of the fair market value thereof.' "
67. The trust will, however, have to value the stocks it holds if it is
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the stock's value in order to justify his current tax deduction."8
Of course, valuation presents a problem only when the stock is not
actively traded. The exclusive benefit rule probably does not ap-
ply to the employer's contribution of stock if the employer is not
legally obligated to contribute to the trust and the trust can readily
dispose of the stock. 9 However, if the employer is under a legal
obligation to contribute to the trust, it is likely that the exclusive
benefit rule will apply. For example, if the employer overvalues his
contribution to the trust, the trust's receipts will be reduced. Since
,the trust can enforce the employer's, legal obligation to contribute
to the trust, a failure by the trust to compel the employer to fulfill
his obligation would appear to be a violation of the exclusive
benefit rule. In addition, the prohibited transactions rule probably
applies to the extent it duplicates the limitations imposed by the
exclusive benefit rule.70
Under the 1939 Code the Commissioner had ruled that a cor-
poration recognized gain if the value, of the contributed stock ex-
part of a profit-sharing, stock bonus, or money purchase pension plan.
These trust funds must be value inventoried annually on a specified date.
Rev. Rul. 57-163, 1957-1 CuM. BULL. 128, 137.
68. I.R.C. § 404(a). For a discussion of the deductibility of the em-
ployer's contributions see Note, Deductibility of Employer Contributions to
Employee-Benefit Plans, 37 MInN. L. REv. 126 (1953).
69. The exclusive benefit rule applies only to the creation and operation
of the trust. I.R.C. § 401(a). The trust is a donee rather than an investor
if the employer is not obligated to contribute to the trust and if the trust
has not had a reasonable time to dispose of the stock. The exclusive bene-
fit rule does not come into effect, in this case, -until the trust is an investor.
70. See notes 38-40 supra and accompanying text. The adequate se-
curity and reasonable interest rate requirements probably do not apply be-
cause they are restricted to trust loans to the employer. I.R.C. § 503 (c)(1).
However, the general provision, § 503(c) (6), undoubtedly would apply if
the contribution were to result "in a substantial diversion of [the trusts]
. . . income or corpus." In addition, there may be a question of whether
the contribution of company stock is a "substantial purchase of . . . other
property for more 'than adequate consideration." I.R.C. § 503(c) (4).(Emphasis added.) The employer's contribution to the trust is in exchange
for the employees' personal services. Hence, in effect, a purchase has oc-
curred since the trust is in the same position as if it had purchased the
stock. Compare notes 106-07 inIra and accompanying text. If this analy-
sis is correct, subsection (4) of the prohibited transactions rule will apply to
contributions of substantial amounts of company stock. However, if the
prohibited transactions rule can only be applied by subsection (6), it will
cover only those contributions that amount to a substantial diversion of
trust funds. On the other hand, the employer can argue that subsection (4)
does not apply because the contribution is not, in fact, a purchase by the
trust. It does not necessarily. follow that a transaction that results in the
trust being in the same bosition as an active purchaser is, under the Code, a
purchase. Furthermore, the employer can point to the less restrictive cov-
erage of subsection (6) and argue that interpreting the word "purchase"
in a liberal manner contradicts the apparent intent of Congress as mani-
fested in the general provision to limit "other transactions" only if there is
a substantial diversion of trust funds. This question has not been litigated
or interpreted by the Commissioner.
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ceeded its adjusted basis.7 ' However, section 1032, added by the
1954 Code, provides that the corporation does not recognize gain
or loss when it receives "money or other property in exchange for"
its stock.72 Thus, the 1954 Code reverses the position taken by
the Commissioner under the 1939 Code. 3
B. INVESTMENT IN EMPLOYER DEBT SECURITIES
As in the case of trust investment in company stock, the ex-
clusive benefit rule does not specifically restrict trust investments
in the employer's debt securities.' Nevertheless, the prohibited
transactions rule subjects trust investment in the employer's debt
securities to more stringent regulation than similar investments in
company stock. Trust investment in employer debt securities must
be adequately secured and must return a reasonable rate of inter-
est.75 Furthermore, problems not encountered in relation to em-
ployer contributions of company stock may arise when the em-
ployer contributes his debt securities.
1. Adequate Security
Treasury regulations have interpreted the term "adequate se-
curity" to mean that the employer's promise to pay must be se-
cured "by something of value" in addition to a demonstration of
his ability to make repayment.7 ' This additional security must in-
sure that no loss of principal or interest will result from the loan."
71. I.T. 3357, 1940-1 CuM. BULL. 11.
72.
No gain or loss shall be recognized to a corporation on the receipt
of money or other property in exchange for stock (including treasury
stock) of such corporation.
I.R.C. § 1032.
However, this provision does not alter the effect of International Freight-
ing Corp. v. Commissioner, 135 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1943). In Freighting
a subsidiary's contribution of its parent's appreciated stock to an em-
ployees' stock bonus plan resulted in a taxable gain to the subsidiary.
Id. at 313.
73. This view is supported by the Regulations which provide that "the
disposition by a corporation of shares of its own stock .. . for money or
other property does not give rise to taxable gain . . . regardless of the
nature of the transaction or the facts and circumstances involved." Treas.
Reg. § 1.1032-1(a) (1956). (Emphasis added.)
74. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b)(5) (1958). See Rev. Rul. 46, 1953-1
CUM. BULL. 287.
"Debt securities" is used in this Note to include such evidences of an
obligation to pay money as corporate bonds, mortgages, and promissory
notes. See BLACK, LAW DICTIONARY 490, 1522 (4th ed. 1951).
The reporting requirements applicable to investment in company stock
also apply to trust investments in the employer's debt securities. See note
57 supra and accompanying text.
75. I.R.C. § 503 (c) (1).
76. Treas. Reg. § 1.503(c)-1(b) (1958).
77. Treas. Reg. § 1.503(c)-1(c) (Examples (1) and (4)) (1958).
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Hence, the additional security obviously must have a fair market
value that exceeds the employer's indebtedness to the trust, the in-
terest on the loan, and other related charges.7s Thus, an accom-
modation endorsement provides adequate security only if the
amount loaned on ihe basis of the endorsement security was at
all times substantially less than the unencumbered assets of the
guarantor.79 Besides accommodation endorsements, additional se-
curity may consist of an assignment of a contract, collateral se-
curities, a lien against specific property, or an assurance of repay-
ment by a commercially solvent guarantor or surety. s° However,
unsecured corporate debenture bonds cannot fulfill the adequate
security requirement because they are mere evidences of indebt-
edness. A partnership's subordinated debenture bonds are simi-
larly inadequate since the general partners are fully liable for the
firm's debts. The partners' guarantees do not increase the security
interest.81
The 1954 Code restriction on trust investments in the employ-
er's obligations is inconsistent with the Codes treatment of the
trust's investment in company stock. The Code provides that trust
investments in the employer's debt obligations must be adequately
secured, but investments in company stock are not subject to the
same requirement.82
78. See Rev. Proc. 56-33, 1956-2 CUM. BULL. 1394, 1396.
79. See Treas. Reg. § 1.503(c)-1(c) (Example (1)) (1958).
80. Treas. Reg. § 1.503(c)-l(b) (1958); Rev. Proc. 56-33, 1956-2
Cum. BULL. 1394, 1396.
An assignment of monies due under a government contract also consti-
tutes adequate security for a trust's loan to its employer-government con-
tractor. A recent decision of the United States Comptroller General held
that an assignment of "moneys due or to become due" under the Assign-
ment of Claims Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 1029 (1940), 31 U.S.C. § 203 (1958),
constitutes a valid assignment. 40 Comp. Gen. 174 (1960). See also 36
Comp. Gen. 290 (1956).
81. Treas. Reg. § 1.503(c)-l(c) (Example (1)) (1958). See What Loans
Can an Employee's Trust Make to the Employer? 4 . TA XATION 341, 342
(1956).
82. See Levin, Recent Developments in Pension and Profit Sharing,
N.Y.U. 16TH INST. FED. TAX 23, 33-35 (1958).
The policy reasons for restricting investments in the employer's obliga-
tions are identical to the reasons for controlling trust investments in
company stock. See notes 54-55 supra and accompanying text. However,
company debentures have priority, in the event of liquidation, over the
same stock in which the employees' trust may invest without other security.
Heider v. Hermann Sons Hall Ass'n, 186 Minn. 494, 499, 243 N.W. 699,
701 (1932); 6A FLETCHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 2748 (Wolf perm. ed.
rev. repl. 1950); STEVENS, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS 421 (1949). Therefore,
it is arguable that investments in the employer's obligations should be sub-
ject to less rather than more restrictions. In addition, trust investments
in employer debentures may also provide significant benefits to the em-
ployees' trust.
For example, 1 per cent higher interest return on a pension fund over
a long period of time could enable the company to improve the bene-
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The adequate security requirement has produced absurd re-
sults. As of October 31, 1956, sixteen per cent of the American
Telephone & Telegraph Company's employees' pension trust fund
was invested in Bell System operating companies' debt securities."3
These securities were bought in good faith and at fair prices prior
to the issuance of the regulations defining "adequate security."
The trustees felt that the securities were an attractive investment.
In fact, Bell System debt securities constituted sixteen per cent of
all high grade publicly offered corporate debt issues for the previ-
ous five years. Yet, in order to avoid the prohibited transactions
rule, the regulations required the trust to acquire additional se-
curity. As one fund trustee commented, "It is difficult to under-
stand how the disposition of these high-grade securities with the
consequent loss of nearly $500,000 can possibly be in the interests
of the fund and its employee beneficiaries.""
In the Technical Amendments Act of 1958,85 Congress en-
grafted limitations on the adequate security requirement to correct
the anomalous results under the 1954 Code. As an alternative,
section 503(h) insures that the equivalent of an arms-length
transaction occurs and that the employer's obligations constitute a
reasonably safe investment.86 For example, if the trust purchases
company debentures from a securities underwriter at the public
offering price and at least 50 per cent of the debenture issue is
held by unrelated parties, the employer does not need to provide
fits to their employees by about a fourth. That is, if you assume the
fund is going to earn 2 per cent compound interest and instead it
earns 3 per cent interest, the extra 1 per cent, long-term compound-
ed, would enable the company to improve the pension benefits to the
employees by almost one-fourth without it costing the company an-
other dime.
Hearings Before the Senate Finance Committee on Technical Amendments
Act of 1958, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 195 (1958).
83. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Internal Revenue Taxation
of the House Ways and Means Committee, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 359-67
(1956).
The Bell System operating companies are subsidiaries of the American
Telephone & Telegraph Co. Id. at 362. Hence, § 503(c) applies to the
parent trust's purchase of the subsidiary's debentures-a "downstream"
transaction. See note 34 supra.
84. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Internal Revenue Taxation of
the House Ways and Means Committee, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 362 (1956).
85. 72 Stat. 1606, 1629-31 (1958).
86. First, subsection (h) imposes conditions designed to insure that the
purchase was the equivalent of an arms-length transaction. I.R.C. § 503(h) (1). Second, the trust's acquisition of the employer's obligation must
not exceed 25 per cent of any debenture issue and at least 50 per cent of
that issue must be held by persons independent of the employer. I.R.C.
§ 503(h) (2). Third, not more than 25 per cent of the trust's assets may be
invested in the employer's obligations. I.R.C. § 503(h) (3). See Hearings
Before the Senate Finance Committee on the Technical Amendments Act
of 1958, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 57-58 (1958).
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additional, security if immediately following the investment the
trust does not hold more than 25 per cent of either that issue of
company debentures or of the company's total debt obligations.
Section 503(i) provides an exception to the adequate security re-
quirement if the employer is prohibited by federal law or regula-
tion from pledging as additional security more than one-half the
value of his assets. 7 This provision was adopted to assist unincor-
porated. stock brokerage firms which could not meet the adequate
security requirement because of federal statute and regulation."5
2. Reasonable Interest Rates.
In addition to requiring adequate security, the prohibited trans-
actions rule requires that trust loans to the employer return a rea-
sonable" rate of interest. 9 While the regulations do not attempt to
define a reasonable rate of interest, the rate would undoubtedly be
sufficient if it were commensurate with the rate that the trust could
obtain on similar investments in nonemployer obligations. Thus,
one commentator has suggested that if the trust's loan to the em-
ployer provided for an interest rate of 4 per cent and the pre-
vailing rate were 5 per cent, the loan would probably constitute a
prohibited transaction even though the lower interest rate would
otherwise have been "reasonable."90 If the interest rate received
by the trust is unreasonable because it is too low, the trust loses
its exempt status.91
On the other hand, if the trust charges the employer an un-
reasonably high interest rate, the prohibited transaction rule is,
87. Three requirements must be met. First, the employer must be pro-
hibited by federal law or regulation from encumbering his assets. LR.C.§ 503(i) (1). Second, the loan must have the written approval of a trustee
who is independent of the employer and such approval must not have been
previously denied. I.R.C. § 503(i)(2). Third, the overall trust investment
in the employer's obligations without adequate security cannot exceed 25
per cent of the value of the trust's assets. I.R.C. § 503(i)(3).
88. See S. REP_ No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 51-52 (1958). The re-
strictions applicable to unincorporated stock brokerage firms are contained
in § 8(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 888 (1934), as
amended, 49 Stat. 704 (1935), 15 U.S.C. § 78h(a) (1958), and § 5(a) of
the Federal System Board of Governor's regulation T, 12 C.F.R. § 220.5(a) (1959).
89. I.R.C. § 503(c) (1).
90. See What Loans Can an Employee's Trust Make to the Employer?
4 1. TAXATION 341-42 (1956).
As previously noted, the prohibited transactions rule does not encompass
unsecured loans by the trust fund to the employer's parent corporation.
Rev. Rul. 58-526, 1958-2 CUM. BULL. 269. Thus, the reasonable rate of
interest requirement in § 503(c)(1) would not apply to such a transac-
tiofi.' Nevertheless, a trust loan at less than reasonable rates to the em-
ployer's parent would undoubtedly disqualify the trust on the ground that
the transaction would not be for the exclusive benefit of the employees.
91. See text accompanying note 43 supra.
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of course, not violated. The employer, however, will be deemed to
have made a constructive contribution to the employees' trust to the
extent of the excess interest.9" It is, nevertheless, to the trust's
advantage to set the rate too high rather than too low. The penalty
for erring on the "high side" is merely a denial of the employer's
interest deduction for the excess amount, not a loss of the trust's
tax-exempt status.93
If, because of the constructive contribution to the pension trust,
the employer's total contributions exceed his allowable deduction,"'
section 404(a)(1) (D) allows a carryover of unused deductions
to succeeding tax years.9 In 1953 the Commissioner ruled, under
a similar 1939 Code "carryover" provision,9" that even if the con-
structive contribution exceeds the deductible limit, the trust is not
disqualified.97 However, if the constructive contribution is part
of a design to circumvent the Code's limitations on deductible
contributions, the employer will be deprived of the carry-over pro-
visions.9"
3. Contributions of the Employer's Debt Securities
Additional questions are raised when the employer contributes
his debt securities to the employees' trust. The first question is
whether the employer may deduct the contribution in the year of
transfer, or whether he must postpone the deduction until the ob-
ligation is liquidated. A second question is whether the adequate
security and reasonable rate of interest requirements apply to such
employer contributions.
Section 404(a) provides that the employer's contribution is
deductible only after it is "paid" to the trust. Analytically, the em-
ployer's contribution of his debt securities constitutes either a pres-
ent payment or an enforceable obligation to make a future con-
92. See text commencing at note 115 infra and Rev. Rul. 46, 1953-1
CuM. BULL. 287, 288.
93. While there is no requirement that the interest deduction be reason-
able, Dorzback v. Collison, 195 F.2d 69, 72 (3d Cir. 1952); Arcade Realty
Co., 35 T.C. No. 33 (Nov. 10, 1960), payments in excess of a reasonable
amount to a related party are not interest payments because they are not a
result of the indebtedness. See 4 MERTENS §§ 26.03, 26.04. Compare Rev.
Rul. 46, 1953-1 CuM. BULL. 287, 288.
94. The limits on allowable deductions for contributions to pension
trusts are contained in § 404(a) (1). For similar restrictions on contributions
to stock bonus and profit-sharing trusts, see I.R.C. § 404(a) (3) (A). Com-
pare I.R.C. § 404(a) (7).
95. See I.R.C. § 404(a) (3) (A) for a similar rule applicable to stock
bonus and profit-sharing trusts. Cf. I.R.C. § 404(d).
96. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 2 3 (p), 53 Stat. 15. See also I.R.C.§ 404(d) which allows the carryover of unused deductions that arose under
the 1939 Code.
97. Rev. Rul. 46, 1953-1 CuM. BULL. 287-88.
98. Ibid.
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tribution. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in Dick
Bros. v. Commissioner,9 held that the transfer of a check to a
pension fund trustee was a present payment.100 However, prior to
the Dick case, the Tax Court had supported the Commissioner in
Logan Engineering' and held that the transfer of a negotiable
note did not constitute a present payment. When the latter issue
was presented in Sachs v. Commissioner (the combined Sachs and
Slaymaker case),102 the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
refused to follow the Logan rule. The Third Circuit ruled that a
present payment occurred when the negotiable note was delivered.
However, the Commissioner has not acquiesced in Sachs and Slay-
maaker.
The prohibited transactions rule, however, poses an additional
problem. The Dick and Sachs and Slaymaker decisions were de-
cided under the 1939 Code which did not apply the adequate se-
curity requirement to employees' trusts. Therefore, the second ques-
tion, whether the employer's contribution of his debt securities to
the trust must comply with the adequate security and reasonable
rate of interest requirements, remains unanswered. Although the
case law is silent on this point, there is no reason to believe that
these provisions are inapplicable to contributed employer debt se-
curities.'0 3 The employer's satisfaction of his legal obligation"0
to contribute to the trust constitutes compensation for the em-
99. 205 F.2d 64 (3d Cir. 1953), reversing 18 T.C. 832 (1952).
100. On the other hand, conditional contributions are not deductible
until actually paid unless the condition attached is the Commissioner's ini-
tial approval of the plan. Rev. Rul. 60-276, 1960 INT. Rnv. BULL. No.
34, at 11. See Branham Co., 19 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 168, 174 (1960).
101. 12 T.C. 860 (1949), appeal dismissed, Oct. 4, 1949 (7th Cir.). The
court declined to follow the reasoning of Modie 1. Spiegel, 12 T.C. 524(1949), which held that the delivery of a check was payment of a charitable
contribution. The court also refused to extend the rationale of Musselman-
Hub Brake Co. v. Commissioner, 139 F.2d 65 (6th Cir. 1943), which held
that the delivery of a negotiable note by a solvent maker constituted pay-
ment of interest or business expenses.
102. 208 F.2d 313 (3d Cir. 1953), remanding 11 CCH Tax Ct. Mem.
882 (1952), and reversing 18 T.C. 1001 (1952). See Time Oil Co. v. Com-
missioner, 258 F.2d 237, 240 (9th Cir. 1958) where the court agreed with
the Sachs and Slaymaker decision.
103. Section 503(c)(1), the adequate security and reasonable interest
rate requirements, applies only when the employees' trust "lends any part
of its income or corpus." Although the employer's contribution of an un-
secured note technically is not a loan, there is no question that in substance
a loan has occurred. But cf. Lauinger v. Commissioner, 60-2 U.S. Tax
Cas. 9964 (2d Cir. 1960).
104. The Code does not require the employer to be legally obligated to
the trust in order for the pension or profit-sharing plan to be qualified.
However, § 9(a) of the National Labor Relations Act requires the employer
to bargain on the establishment of pension plans. Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB,
170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1948). Hence, it is likely that negotiated pension
plans will stipulate that the employer is obligated to contribute to the trust
fund.
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ployees' services; therefore, the employers contribution may be re-
garded as a purchase which must comply with the prohibited
transactions rule.0 3 Furthermore, it is arguable that if the trust
continues to hold the employer's obligations after having a reason-
able opportunity to sell or exchange them, the trust is in the same
position as if it had purchased the obligations.' By not disposing
of the employer's debt securities, the trust may be actively invest-
ing in them. Therefore, unless the contributed debt obligations
are adequately secured and pay a reasonable rate of interest, the
trust may lose its exempt status."0 7
C. REAL PROPERTY TRANSACTIONS
Trust investment in the employer's business may also be ac-
complished by the acquisition of real property which is subse-
quently leased to the employer. The trust may acquire real property
in three ways: (1) the trust may purchase realty from an unrelated
party, (2) the trust may purchase realty from the employer, or
(3) the employer may contribute realty to the trust.'
1. Purchases of Real Property from an Unrelated Party
The trust's purchase of real property from an unrelated third
party must, of course, be for the exclusive benefit of the em-
ployees. Thus, the price must not exceed the property's fair mar-
ket value. Otherwise, there are no significant tax hurdles to be
overcome by the trust fund. A trust purchase of real property from
an unrelated third party is not within the prohibited transactions
rule since there is no identity of interest between the buyer and
seller. 9
105. See note 70 supra.
106.
If an organization subject to section 503(c) purchases debentures is-
sued by a person specified in section 503(c), the purchase is consider-
ed, for purposes of section 503(c)(1), as a loan made by the pur-
chaser to the issuer on the date of such purchase. For example, if an
exempt organization subject to section 503(c) makes a purchase
through a registered security exchange of debentures issued by a per-
son described in section 503(c), and owned by an unknown party, the
purchase will be considered as a loan to the issuer by the purchaser.
Treas. Reg. § 1.503(c)-l(b) (1958). (Emphasis added.) Thus, if the pur-
chase of employer's debt securities from an unrelated party is considered
a loan to the employer, the employer's contribution would seem to be in the
same category.
107. Compare note 69 supra.
108. The investment must, of course, be authorized by the trust instru-
ment or local law, and it must also meet the prerequisites of a sound in-
vestment. However, the reporting requirements applicable to investments
in company stock or the employer's obligations, notes 57-60 & 74 supra,
do not apply to the trust's real estate transactions with the employer.
109. I.R.C. § 503(c).
596
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2. Purchases of real property fr'om the employer
The prohibited transactions rule applies to trust purchases of
real estate from the employer. Consequently, the trust will lose
its exempt status if it purchases such property for more than ade-
quate consideration."' However, even if the purchase is for an
adequate consideration,"' the employer should be aware of other
tax problems. First, the transaction is between related parties and
if the property's selling price is less than the employer's basis for
the property, the employer's loss will not be recognized." Thus,
the employer is denied the -loss deduction otherwise available when
he sells property." On the other hand, if the property's selling
price exceeds the employer's basis, he will have to recognize
gain. U
If the selling price is the same as the employer's basis, there
would appeai to be no taxable gain. But if the property has ap-
preciated the Commissioner could argue that the portion of the
property's fair market value which exceeds the selling price is a
constructive contribution by the employer."' If the employer's
contributions have already reached his deductible limit, the con-
strtictive contribution will not give rise to an immediate deduc-
tion." Nevertheless, this appreciation may result in immediate
taxable gain to the employer."' Thus, the employer will have
sacrificed a present economic gain (the amount of the apprecia-
tion) without a corresponding alteration of the tax consequences.
The increase in the employer's working capital will not be as great
as it would have been if the selling price equaled the property's
fair market value.
110. LR.C. § 503 (c) (4).
111. In order to assure that the purchase is for an adequate considera-
tion, the property should be valued by an independent appraiser.
112. I.R.C. § 267. The trust's basis for the property is cost. I.R.C.
§ 1012.
113. I.R.C. § 165. The employer will not be able to recognize this loss
deduction unless he can transfer the property's basis to "exchange prop-
erty" I.R.C § 267(d) (2).
114. I.R.C. § 1001.
115. If the property's value is less than the employer's basis, the trust's
purchase for a price set at basis would constitute a prohibited transaction.
I.R.C. § 503 (c) (4).
116. The deduction arising from the constructive contribution may, of
course, be deducted in succeeding tax years. See notes 94-95 supra and
accompanying text.
117. See text accompanying notes 124-32 infra. Section 1032, which
permits corporate non-recognition of gain realized from dealings in its
own stock, only applies to the exchange of stock for money or other prop-
erty; therefore, the employer cannot use § 1032 to avoid the recognition
of gain realized from the transfer of real property. See note 72 supra
and accompanying text.
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3. Contributions of the employer's real estate
As in the contribution of company stock, the prohibited trans-
actions rule may apply to the employer's contribution of real
property to the employees' trust if the transaction results in a sub-
stantial diversion of trust funds or if the transaction amounts to a
purchase by the trust."'
As noted earlier, the employer's contribution is deductible by
him if the contribution complies with section 404. Section 404
does not restrict the employer's contribution in form to money or
securities." 9 Hence, the employer's contribution of a fee interest
in real property is deductible up to the property's fair market value.
However, a reservation in the deed may raise a question of whether
or not the contribution complies with section 404; that is, was it
"paid into the pension trust." '120 For example, in Colorado Nat'l
Bank 2' the employer conveyed six contiguous lots in the city of
Denver to the fund trustees subject to a lease-back and a repur-
chase option. The Commissioner argued that the contribution was
not paid to the trust because cash or its equivalent would not be
paid until the employer exercised his repurchase option. 2 How-
ever, analogizing from the area of charitable contributions, the Tax
Court held that the bank had made a "present contribution of
property which represented a payment in kind rather than cash,
but a payment, nevertheless, within the words and intent of the
applicable statutory provisions. ''123
The employer's deduction is limited to the fair market value of
the contributed property and, even if fair market value is less than
the employer's basis, loss is not recognized. However, when the
fair market value of contributed property exceeds the employer's
basis, there is a question of whether gain must be recognized.
The taxpayer who contributes property (other than money) to a
charity is allowed a deduction in the amount of the property's
fair market value and is not required to recognize gain.'24 Thus,
118. See note 70 supra.
119. See Treas. Reg. § 1.404(a)-1(b) (1956) (by implication).
120. I.R.C. § 404(a) (1).
121. 30 T.C. 933 (1958), acq., 1959-1 CuM. BULL. 3.
122. The court found that the rental charge and the option price were
reasonable and that the rentals did not, in fact, reduce the option price.
The Commissioner's argument was based on the contention that the con-
tribution was, at best, a future obligation to make a cash payment to the
pension trust when the repurchase option was exercised. However, this
argument ignores the fact that the trust could have sold the property,
subject to the lease and option, to a third party. Colorado Nat'l Bank, 30
T.C. 933, 934-35 (1958).
123. Id. at 936.
124. Campbell v. Prothro, 209 F.2d 331 (5th Cir. 1951) (charitable
contribution of calves); White v. Broderick, 104 F. Supp. 213 (D. Kan.
1952) (charitable contribution of wheat); cf. Elsie SoRelle, 22 T.C. 459
the question apparently depends on whether an employer's con-
tribution in kind and the analogous charitable contribution in kind
should be subject to the same non-recognition rule. In United
States v. General Shoe Corp., the Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit held that the employer's contribution of appreciated
property to his employees' pension trust resulted in the recogni-
tion of gain to the extent of the appreciation, even though the em-
ployer had no legal obligation to contribute to the trust.12  Al-
though the Sixth Circuit had previously ruled that appreciated
property transferred in a divorce settlement was incapable of be-
ing assigned a fair market value, 27 the court in General Shoe
.readily distinguished that decision. 28 The court measured the
value of the employer's economic benefit by the fair market (ap-
praised) value of the transferred property.' 9 The employer ar-
gued that no gain had been realized. In reply, the court stated
that "the taxpayer realized exactly the same gain here by trans-
ferring the real estate as it would have, had it sold the real estate
for fair market (or appraised) value and contributed the funds to
the trust."'3 The court's analysis seems incomplete because it
failed to consider the rule applied, in analogous circumstances, to
charitable contributions in kind when appreciated property is
transferred to the donee. While the policy reasons for encourag-
ing charitable contributions also apply to employer contributions
to employees' trusts, the court could have found that the two situa-
tions are distinguishable. The rule applied to charitable contribu-
tions in kind can be justified by the fact that the donor has re-
ceived only an intangible satisfaction.' 3 ' On the other hand, in
General Shoe the employer received the employees' personal serv-
(1954), and Estate of Farrier, 15 T.C. 277 (1950), where gifts of wheat
and cattle to the donor's children did not result in taxable gain to the
donor. See Treas. Reg. § 1.170-1(c) (1958); Rev. Rul. 55-138, 1955-1
GUM. BULL. 223.
125. 282 F.2d 9 (6th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 843 (1961).
126. 282 F.2d at 11. However, the court examined only the trust instru-
ment; it did not examine the terms of the collective bargaining agreement
which may have obligated the employer to contribute to the trust.
The court found the reasoning of International Freighting Corp. v. Com-
missioner, 135 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1943), to be persuasive. In Freighting
the employer recognized capital gain on the transfer of appreciated stock
to the employees' stock bonus plan. Id. at 313.
127. Commissioner v. Marshman, 279 F.2d 27 (6th Cir. 1960).
128. 282 F.2d at 13.
129. Ibid.
130. Id. at 12. This argument is supported by Helvering v. Horst, 311
U.S. 112 (1940), where the Supreme Court held that "realization may oc-
cur when the last step is taken by which he obtains the fruition of the
economic gain which has already accrued to him." Id. at 115.
131. See 5 MERTENS § 31.01.
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ices in exchange for the contributed property. 132 Therefore, de-
spite the court's limited analysis, its decision seems correct.
4. Leases of Trust-Owned Real Estate to the Employer
Trust ownership of real property is useful to the employer only
when the property is leased to him.'33 This transaction may be
beneficial to both the trust and the employer because (1) the
trust will retain the property when the lease expires, (2) the lease
transaction may constitute a prudent investment which returns an
adequate yield, and (3) the employer will acquire additional
working capital.'34 Since the lease transaction is between related
132. Although the court stated that "the taxpayer is correct in its con-
tention that it did not receive a tangible benefit," United States v. General
Shoe Corp., 282 F.2d 9, 12 (6th Cir. 1960), this statement ignores the
fact that the employer's deduction is conditioned on his receipt of the em-
ployer's services. As the Regulations point out,
contributions may . . . be deducted under section 404(a) only to
the extent that they are ordinary and necessary expenses during the
taxable year . . . and are compensation for personal services actually
rendered.
Treas. Reg. § 1.404(a)-1(b) (1956). (Emphasis added.) See I.R.C. § 404
(a); Some Uses of Appreciated Property Bring Realization of Gain and
Tax, 14 J. TAXATION 77 (1961).
133. The employer benefits from a leaseback because it allows an
immediate rent deduction which may be more than the depreciation al-
lowance on the same property. That is, the transaction converts the cost
of a fixed asset, which may be nondepreciable (land), into a tax deduction.
See Colorado Nat'l Bank, 30 T.C. 933, 934 (1958).
The employer's sale of property to the trust is not advisable if there is
no leaseback. If the employer would not have been able to sell the property
to an unrelated party at the same price received from the trust, a sale to
the trust would violate the prohibited transactions rule. On the other hand,
if the price is adequate and no leaseback is sought by the employer, a dis-
position to an unrelated party is preferable because the employer's work-
ing capital is increased to the same extent and the valuation problem is
avoided. See text accompanying note 110 supra.
Section 512(b) (3) excludes real property rentals from the unrelated
business income tax. However, this exception does not apply to real prop-
erty rentals in the case of a "business lease." I.R.C. § 512(b) (4).
In Century Electric Co. v. Commissioner, 192 F.2d 155 (8th Cir. 1951).
the seller was denied a capital loss upon the exchange of a fee for a 95
year lease because the transaction constituted a "like kind" exchange. See
I.R.C. 1031(a). However, when the exchange is between the employer
and his employees' trust, the loss is denied recognition by § 267(a), even
though the leaseback is for less than 30 years. Thus, because of § 267, the
Century Electric problem does not arise in connection with a sale-Icaseback
between the employer and the employees' trust.
134. See Greenfield, Corporate Benefits in Using the Sale-Leaseback
Device, 37 TAxEs 1017, 1019 (1959); Business Week, Jan. 31, 1959, pp. 88,
97-98. -
Of course, the employer should be aware of the similarities between a
sale-leaseback transaction and a mortgage transaction. The sale-lease-
back should be used only after having compared its advantages and dis-
advantages with a mortgage of the property. For example, when the em-
ployer mortgages property, his working capital is increased to the extent
NOTES
parties, it will -be carefully scrutinized." If the rental paid by the
employer is too low, or if, because of the property acquisition, the
trust fund does not have -sufficient liquidity, the trust will have
violated the exclusive benefit rule.136 On the other hand, if the
rental charged the employer exceeds the prevailing rate for com-
parable property, the Commissioner will disallow the employer's
"rent" deduction to the extent of the excess .13
If the employer and his employees' trust include a purchase op-
tion in the lease agreement, they should carefully consider the
terms of the option. If the option price is less than the property's
fair market value and the rent payments approximate the prevail-
ing rental rate, the trust will lose its exempt status on the ground
that a prohibited transaction has occurred.'" On the other
hand, when an option price less than the property's fair market
value is coupled with rent payments that exceed the prevailing
rate, the Commissioner may treat the transaction as an installment
sales contract139 and disallow the employer-lessee's "rent" deduc-
tion. 4° In the latter situation, the Commissioner's theory is that
the payments are not for the employer's use of property but rather
to acquire- ownership thereof. Due to these problems, one writer
of the mortgage, and no capital gain is recognized-even if the mortgage
exceeds the employer's basis for the property, Woodsam Associates v.
Commissioner, 198 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1952). I.R.C. § 1001 requires a
"sale or disposition." In addition, the employer-mortgagor retains title to
the property while he acquires an interest deduction for the interest pay-
ments. I.R.C. § 163(a). However, in the case of a sale-leaseback for cash
the employer's working capital is increased by the property's market value.
While gain realized from the sale must be recognized and the employer
does not retain title, the rent deductions will normally exceed the interest
payments on a mortgage. I.R.C. § 162(a) (3).
135. E.g., Midland Ford Tractor Co. v. Commissioner, 277 F.2d 11,
114 (8th Cir. 1960); J. J. Kirk, Inc., 34 T.C. 130, 137 (1960). When the
transaction is between unrelated parties the rental rate is determined in an
arms-length transaction and therefore is not limited to a reasonable amount.
J. J. Kirk, Inc., supra at 136-39; Stanley Imerman, 7 T.C. 1030, 1037
(1946). See 4MERTENS § 25.110.
136. See text accompanying note 27 supra. Since the lease of realty may
constitute, in effect, a loan by the trust, the trust may have to comply
with the reasonable interest rate requirement. I.R.C. § 503(c)(1).
137. E.g., J. J. Kirk, Inc., 34 T.C. .130, 136-39 (1960); Stanley Imer-
.man, 7 T.C. 1030, 1037 (1946). See4 MERTENS § 25.110.
138. I.R.C. § 503(c) (5).
139. E.g., Haggard v. Commissioner, 241 F.2d 288, 289 (9th Cir. 1956);
Breece Veneer & Panel Co. v. Commissioner, 232 F.2d 319, 321-22
(7th Cir. 1956).
140. E.g., Beus v. Commissioner, 261 F.2d" 176, 181 (91h Cir. 1958);
Haggard v. Commissioner, supra note 139; Breece Veneer & Panel Co.
v. Commissioner, supra note 139, at 322-24. When the rent deduction is
denied, only the improvements standing on the land will provide the em-
ployer with a depreciation deduction; the land is non-depreciable. I.R.C.§ 167.
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has recommended that purchase options be avoided."" However,
a more logical and equally cautious approach is available. The
trust may enter into a lease agreement if the option price is set
at the property's fair market value and the rental payments ap-
proximate the prevailing rate. That is, the rental payments must be
a condition of the employer's continued possession of the proper-
ty. 42
Finally, the parties must insure that the transaction does not
constitute a "business lease" taxable under the Code's unrelated
business income tax provisions. Failure to avoid the "business
lease" classification will expose the trust to taxation at individual
rates on the allocable net rental income.4 3 Moreover, if the
trust's rental yield from the leased property 44 is rendered less
than a reasonable rate because of the unrelated business income
tax, the trust may have violated the exclusive benefit rule. 4 '
A business lease occurs when (I) the trust leases real property
for more than five years and (2) an indebtedness, which the trust
would not have incurred except for the lease, exists at the end of
the trust's tax year.'46 Furthermore, if the indebtedness exists, a
lease of five years or less will constitute a business lease after the
employer occupies the property for more than five years under
successive leases. 47 In that case, the tax is imposed, only in the
sixth and succeeding years in which the employer continues to
occupy the property. 14
141. Greenfield, supra note 134, at 1019.
142. Breece Veneer & Panel Co. v. Commissioner, 232 F.2d 319, 324
(7th Cir. 1956).
143. I.R.C. §§ 511(b), 512, 514. Allocable net rental income consists
of a percentage of the rent received under the business lease less a per-
centage of the deductions allowed in § 514(a) (3) for the expenses of own-
ership. The percentage figure applied is determined by dividing the amount
of the business lease indebtedness at the close of the tax year by the prop-
erty's adjusted basis at the close of the tax year. I.R.C. § 514(a)(1). See
Wallis, Employees' Trusts Under New Code, 93 TRUSTS & ESTATES 866,
869 (1954).
144. The leased property includes the personal property leased with the
real property. I.R.C. § 514(d).
145. The exclusive benefit rule may be violated on the ground that such
a lease transaction is not prudent; it benefits only the employer. I.R.C.
§ 401(a). The prohibited transactions rule, however, is not violated because
the trust will have received a reasonable rent on its investment before taxes.
I.R.C. § 503(c) (1).
146. I.R.C. § 514(b), (c). See Address by Isidore Goodman, Western
Pension Conference (Los Angeles Chapter), Nov. 17, 1960, in 2 CCH
PENSION PLAN RUL. 1 11106.
147. I.R.C. § 514(b) (2).
148. I.R.C. § 514(b) (2) (B).
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D. PERSONAL PROPERTY TRANSACTIONS
As in the case of real property, the employees' trust may acquire
ownership of personal property by purchase from an unrelated
party, from the employer, or by a contribution in kind from the
employer. The trust may then lease the personal property to the
employer.
With the exception of the business lease rule, the tax problems
connected with real property transactions are equally applicable to
personal property transactions. However, in contrast to the exempt
status provided for income received from real property leases
which are not within the business leases category, 4 9 income de-
rived from a lease of personal property may be subject to the un-
related business income tax. The definition of "unrelated trade or
business" contained in section 513 (b) must be read in conjunction
with section 512(a) to determine what constitutes a qualified
trust's "unrelated business taxable income."1 ' When read togeth-
er, these two sections define "unrelated business taxable income"
as the gross income derived from any trade or business regularly
.carried on by the trust, minus the allowed deductions. Thus, had
the Code provided no exceptions to the unrelated business tax-
able income provision, rent payments received from the lease of
either realty or personalty would be subject to the unrelated
business income tax (assuming the ownership and lease of prop-
erty constitutes a "business regularly carried on") . However,
the Code does provide specific exceptions to this tax. Rent pay-
ments received from real property (including personal property
leased with the real property) are specifically excluded; 2 leases
149. I.R.C. § 512(b) (3).
150.
The term "unrelated business taxable income" means the gross in-
come derived by any organization from any unrelated trade or business
(as defined in section 513) regularly carried on by it, less the deduc-
tions allowed by this chapter which are directly connected with the
carrying on of such trade or business, both computed with the excep-
tions, additions, and limitations provided in subsection (b).
I.R.C. § 512(a)
The term "unrelated trade or business" means, in the case of . . .
(2) a trust described in section 401(a) . . . which is exempt from




A trade or business is regularly carried on when the activity is con-
ducted with sufficient consistency to indicate a continuing purpose of
the organization to derive some of its income from such activity. An
activity may be regularly carried on even though its performance is in-
frequent or seasonal.
Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(a) (3) (1958).
152. "There shall be excluded [from unrelated business taxable income]
19611
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45: 575
of personal property are not so excluded. Therefore, trust income
regularly received from the lease of personal property is subject
to the unrelated business income tax.153
In a recent case before the Tax Court, Cooper Tire & Rubber
Co. Employees' Retirement Fund,"M an employees' trust bor-
rowed $200,000 which it combined with $144,830 of its own
funds and purchased rubber-making machinery from an unrelated
third party; this machinery was leased to the employer. The Coi-
missioner assessed a tax deficiency on the employees' trust for
nonpayment of unrelated business income tax. In rcsponsc, the
employees' trust petitioned the Tax Court for a redetermination.
The trust contended that where the trustee had no duties to per-
form other than to collect the rent the trust was engaged in a
passive investment rather than the operation of a trade or busi-
ness 5 5 and, therefore, no unrelated business income tax was due.
all rents from real property (including personal property leased with real
property) ...... I.R.C. § 512(b)(3). Other exclusions include dividends,
interest, royalties and gains or losses from the sale of non-business prop-
erty.
153. In the Senate Finance Committee's explanation of the Internal
Revenue Act of 1950, the committee reported that "the tax on unrelated
business income does not apply to dividends, interest, royalties, and rents(other than certain rents on property acquired with borrowed funds)." S.
REP. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1950). (Emphasis added.) The
committee justified the exclusion of "most rents" by noting that
they are "passive" in character and are not likely to result in serious
competition for taxable businesses having similar income. Moreover,
investment-producing incomes of these types have long been recogniz-
ed as a proper source of revenue for educational and charitable or-
ganizations and trusts.
Id. at 30-31. Thus, personal property rentals are arguably not subject to
the unrelated business income tax. However, in the technical discussion of
the specific provisions of the unrelated business tax section, the committee's
report was more precise. The exclusions from unrelated business net in-
come were limited to
all dividends, interest, annuities, and royalties, and the deductions di-
rectly connected therewith ....(b) In general, rents from real property (including personalty leas-
ed therewith) and the deductions directly connected therewith are also
excluded. . . .The term "rents from real property" does not include
income from the operation of a hotel but does include rents derived
from a lease of the hotel itself. Similarly, income derived from the op-
eration of a parking lot is not considered "rents from real property."
Income received from a business of renting personal property is ex-
cluded under section 422(a)(3) [now I.R.C. § 512(b)(3)] only if
the personal property is leased with real property.
Id. at 108. From this statement it is clear that Congress intended to impose
the unrelated business income tax upon rental income received by em-
ployees' trusts from the lease of personal property which is not leased with
real property.
154. 36 T.C. No. 5 (April 17, 1961) reported in 36.5 P-H TAX C'r.
REP. 1961 [hereinafter cited as Cooper].
155. Brief for Petitioner, pp. 9-10, Cooper. The trust's contention was
contrary to the Commissioner's ruling that a lease of railroad tank cars is
a taxable investment. Rev. Rul. 60-206, 1960-1 CuM. BULL. 201.
NOTES
The trust's theory was that it had loaned capital directly to the
equipment-user instead of lending the funds to an equipment leas-
ing company which would in turn- rent the equipment to Cooper
Tire & Rubber Company. 56 The Commissioner contended that
this is precisely what Congress intended to restrict. He argued that
the unrelated business income tax was "directed primarily at the
problem of unfair competition by tax exempt organizations [by
which they could] . . .purchase property for leasing and lease
for more beneficial rates than an ordinary business."", 7 As an ad-
ditional argument, the Commissioner pointed out that the lease of
a single piece of real property has been held to constitute a trade
or business.' s
The Tax Court, in Cooper, held that the lease of personal prop-
erty was "governed by the same considerations" that control real
property rentals; therefore, the trust was subject to the unrelated
business income tax on its income. However, the acquisition and
lease of personal property may still be an attractive investment
for employees' trusts. The advantages offered by real property
rentals 59 apply equally to the trust's lease of personal property.
Personal property transactions provide additional advantages in
that the trust's dollar investment is more flexible than in real prop-
erty investments; thus, advantageous investment opportunities are
available to smaller trust funds. Furthermore, personal property
leases usually earn a more liberal return than other trust invest-
ments in the employer's business.16 Therefore, the high yield se-
cured from the trust's lease of personal property to the employer
may justify this investment although the trust is subject to an un-
related business income tax.1 6'
CONCLUSION
While the underlying principle of the tax rules governing the
operation of employees' trusts is to insure that tax benefits are
available only to trusts that protect the employees' interests, the
Commissioner has, in practice, modified this approach. Instead of
denying exemption to any trust dealing with the employer-which
a strict application of the exclusive benefit rule arguably requires
-the Commissioner has permitted such investments. If the trust's
dealings with the employer meet the standards of an arms-length
156. Brief for Petitioner, p. 16, Cooper.
157. Brief for Respondent, p. 10, Cooper. See note 153 supra.
158. E.g., Reiner v. United States, 222 F.2d 770, 772-73 (7th Cir.
1955); Anders I. Lagreide, 23 T.C. 508, 512 (1954).
159. See note 134 supra and accompanying text.
160. See Cooper at pp. 36-65-36-66.
161. Ibid.
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transaction, the trust may purchase the employer's stock, obliga-
tions, or property. Instead of making annual cash contributions to
the trust, the employer can contribute his stock, property, or debt
securities to his employees' trust. In addition, the employer may fi-
nance an expansion of his business by leasing trust-owned proper-
ty from the employees' trust.
In the case of trust investments in company stock, the Commis-
sioner has been extraordinarily liberal; except for the exclusive
benefit rule, no effective controls exist. The Commissioner's liber-
ality in permitting trust investments in the employer's stock may
be based on his aim of encouraging the declaration of dividends
by close corporations so that earnings are taxed at the corporate
level.1 62 For example, in the case of trust investments in com-
pany stock, if the employer is to deduct his contributions to the
trust, he will have to distribute the corporation's earnings as divi-
dends instead of as payments to shareholders in the form of sal-
ary.'63 Otherwise, the trust is not being operated for the em-
ployees' exclusive benefit. Furthermore, if the trust has only a
minority interest in the corporation, the trustee's failure to compel
the corporation to declare a dividend6 . may be a breach of his
fiduciary duty. Because of a possible conflict of interest in this case,
the practice of having officers of the employer-company act as
trustees of the employees' trust would seem to be unwise.
The Commissioner's allowance of other trust investments in the
employer's business may also be intended to increase the amount
of working capital available to close corporations. The trust can,
for example, purchase property from the employer and lease it
back. In this case the employer increases his working capital by
(1) the purchase price paid by the trust, and (2) the tax saving
that accrues to the employer because rent payments are dcducti-
ble.'65 In addition, the Commissioner's permissive approach pro-
vides the employer with a method by which he can finance his
employees' trust without a depletion of his investment capital.
While the Commissioner's permissive interpretation of the tax
law applicable to investments of employees' trust funds may en-
courage close corporations to declare dividends and to provide
methods by which additional working capital can be acquired, it is
162. See also 1 O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 2.04 (1958); 2 id.
§§ 8.13-.14.
163. Ibid.
164. See 1 id. § 8.08 (power of minority shareholders to compel the
declaration of dividends).
165. Of course, this increase in the employer's working capital is limited
by three factors: (1) the fact that the employer no longer owns the fac-
tory, (2) the employer's loss of his depreciation deduction, and (3) the
cost of the rent payments made by the employer.
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questionable whether the consequent reduction in the protection of
the employees' interests is desirable. Unfortunately the Code does
not specifically deal with this problem. At the least, Congress
should provide the Commissioner with some specific guides to
clarify the policy to be followed. Thus, if the Congress were to
favor protection of the employees' interests, a specific limit (as in
the case of trust investments in the employer's obligations) on the
amount of company stock that a qualified trust may acquire should
be established.

